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ABSTRACT
Detection of contrast adjustments in the presence of JPEG post
processing is known to be a challenging task. JPEG post processing
is often applied innocently, as JPEG is the most common image
format, or it may correspond to a laundering attack, when it is
purposely applied to erase the traces of manipulation. In this paper,
we propose a CNN-based detector for generic contrast adjustment,
which is robust to JPEG compression. The proposed system relies
on a patch-based Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), trained
to distinguish pristine images from contrast adjusted images, for
some selected adjustment operators of different nature. Robustness
to JPEG compression is achieved by training the CNN with JPEG
examples, compressed over a range of Quality Factors (QFs).
Experimental results show that the detector works very well and
scales well with respect to the adjustment type, yielding very good
performance under a large variety of unseen tonal adjustments.
Index Terms— Adversarial multimedia forensics, adversarial
learning, deep learning for Multimedia Forensics, contrast manip-
ulation detection, cybersecurity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adjustment of contrast and lighting conditions of image sub-
parts is often performed during forgery creation. Therefore, the
problem of detecting such manipulation has been widely studied
in image forensics, and, more recently, in scenarios encompass-
ing the presence of an adversary [1], [2]. Due to the peculiar
traces left by contrast adjustment operators, most early works
were based on the analysis of first order statistics [3]–[5]. Such
approaches, however, are easily circumvented by the adversary,
by means of both targeted [6] and also universal approaches [7].
To cope with such attacks, countermeasures were developed in
turn, based on a second-order analysis [8], [9]. However, in most
cases, the attack is of laundering-type, consisting in the application
of a post-processing operation, e.g., a geometric transformation,
filtering or compression. Laundering attacks have been shown to
be very powerful against manipulation detectors in general [10].
In particular, the performance of contrast manipulation detectors
proposed so far decrease significantly in the presence of even mild
post-processing and, above all, they all exhibit poor robustness
against JPEG compression [3], [5], [8], [10], [11], even when
the compression is very weak. Since images are often stored and
distributed in JPEG format, JPEG compression is also one of the
most common post-processing images are subject to. Therefore,
designing a JPEG-robust contrast adjustment detector is of primary
importance.
In this paper, we face with the above problem by resorting to
JPEG-aware data-driven classification [12], that is, by designing
a data driven detector for contrast adjustment which is trained
to recognise the specific class of JPEG laundering attacks. In
particular, we look for a generic detector of contrast adjustment,
that is, a detector which generalizes well to a wide variety of
tonal adjustments. The proposed method relies on a Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) architecture. The CNN is directly fed with
image pixels (with no pre-processing), hence the discriminative
features for our problem are self-learned by the CNN. Specifically,
the proposed detector relies on a JPEG-aware, patch-based CNN,
which is used to classify image regions, i.e. image patches. A test
image is then divided into patches which are tested separately by
feeding them to the CNN. The soft patch scores (CNN outputs)
are collected and the global decision on the image is performed
on the score vector. All the compression QFs inside a range of
values are considered to train the CNN. Noticeably, we could also
exploit the knowledge of the QF, which can be estimated from the
image header, and specialize the CNN to work for one QF only
(hence training several CNNs). However, such an approach has the
drawback of being easily prone to attacks: just re-saving the image
in uncompressed format (e.g., PNG,..) or compressing again the
image with a different QF would prevent the correct identification
of the QF used to compress the image. Therefore, for our global
manipulation detection task, we considered only one CNN model;
the final detection accuracy is raised by exploiting the fact that
patches coming from a same image are generated under the same
hypothesis (being all pristine or contrast adjusted patches), and
hence should all result in a small (or large) soft value as CNN
output.
Experiments show that our system achieves good performance
over a wide range of QFs. Thanks to the fact that the CNN
is simultaneously trained with different contrast adjustments, our
detector achieves good scalability with respect to the contrast
adjustment type, yielding good performance over a large variety
of contrast, brightness and tonal adjustments, i.e. under processing
mismatch conditions. Good performance are maintained in the
absence of JPEG, that is, when the contrast adjustment is the last
step of the manipulation chain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we
define the detection task we focus on, describe the proposed CNN-
based detector and the network architecture. In Section III-A, we
first detail the methodology followed for conducting our experi-
ments, then we report and discuss the results.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM
Figure 1 schematizes the problem addressed in this paper. We let
hypothesis H0 correspond to the case of pristine images and H1
to the case of contrast adjusted images In both cases, the image is
JPEG compressed at the end, with a given QF. In this scheme, JPEG
compression can also be viewed as a counter-forensic, laundering-
type, attack, due to its known effectiveness in erasing the traces of
contrast manipulations [3], [5], [8], [10], [11].
The architecture of the proposed detection scheme is reported in
Figure 2. The color image is divided into non-overlapping patches
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Fig. 1. Detection task considered in this paper.
Fig. 2. Pipeline of the proposed generic, JPEG-aware, contrast
adjustment detector. Adaptive histogram equalization, gamma cor-
rection (both compression and expansion) and histogram stretching
are used to train the network.
of size 64 × 64 which are fed to a JPEG-aware CNN detector.
The patch scores, i.e. the CNN soft outputs for all the patches,
are then collected and the final decision is based on the score
vector s = (s1, s2, ...sN×M ) (where N×M is the total number of
blocks). The decision is made by simply thresholding the sum of the
scores, i.e. according to the statistic1
∑
i si/(M ·N). Since patches
coming from the same image are drawn under the same hypothesis,
such normalised sum is expected to be large in one case (contrast
adjusted image) and small in the other (pristine image).
The JPEG-aware CNN is trained with JPEG compressed images
on one hand (H0) and images subject to contrast adjustment
followed by JPEG compression on the other (H1). The network
architecture and the training strategy are detailed in the following
sections. In the attempt to build a detector which generalizes to
unseen adjustments, we consider contrast adjustments of different
nature to train the network. Specifically, the processing we selected
are: adaptive histogram equalization, gamma correction (both com-
pression and expansion of the contrast) and histogram stretching.
Regarding the compression QF, we focus on values ranging from
medium-high to high values (i.e., QF ≥ 80), which are commonly
used in many practical applications.
II-A. CNN architecture
Our first attempts to train a network for our problem by using
architectures similar to those adopted for other forensic tasks [13]–
[15] were unsuccessful. A possible explanation is the following:
while some processing operations, e.g. local filtering and double
JPEG, introduce local patterns that a properly trained CNN with few
layers is able to ’easily’ learn, common contrast adjustments do not
leave local visual artifacts, thus making self CNN learning harder
and calling for the adoption of deeper models. We were in fact
able to get higher accuracies by switching to deeper architectures,
with small kernel sizes and small strides of the convolutional
layers, inspired by those adopted in image classification and pattern
1This is a simple and non optimized choice. Other possible fusion
strategies could be adopted.
recognition applications [16]. In particular, as suggested in [16], we
adopt a kernel size of 3× 3 and stride 1 for all the convolutional
layers, and only 1 fully connected layer. We set the number of
convolutional layers to 9, which, although lower than that adopted
in [16] (16-19), is still a significant depth compared to those
commonly considered for forensic tasks [13]–[15] (up to 4-5).
More specifically, the structure of our network for patch classi-
fication (see Figure 3) is detailed as follows: it takes a color patch
of size 64× 64 as input and consists of
• 5 convolutional layers followed by a max-pooling layer. In
the first convolutional layer 32 filters are applied. Then, the
number of filters increases by 32 at each layer. For all the
filters, the kernel size is 3 × 3 and the stride is always 1.
Max-pooling is applied with kernel size 2 × 2 and stride 2
producing a final 27× 27× 160 feature map.
• 3 convolutional layers followed by a max-pooling layer. As
before, the number of filters of size 3×3 (applied with a stride
1) increases by 32 at each layer. The pooling is the same as
before, yielding a 10× 10× 256 feature map.
• A final convolutional layer with 128 filters of size 1 × 1
generating a 10× 10× 128 feature map.
• A fully-connected layer with 250 input neurons, dropout 0.5,
and 2 output neurons, followed by a softmax layer (last 3
blocks in the scheme of Figure 3).
Some comments regarding the main features of the above architec-
ture are in order: the use of many convolutions (5) before the first
pooling layer permits to consider a large receptive field for each
neuron, which is good to capture relationships among pixels in
large neighborhoods; the stride 1 permits to retain as much spatial
information as possible. The purpose of the final convolutional
layer is to reduce the number of parameters by halving the number
of maps (from 256 to 128), without affecting spatial information.
The adoption of only one fully connected layer also permits to
reduce the number of parameters without affecting too much the
performance. Finally, we observe that using small patches (64×64)
permitted us to increase the depth of the network for the same
number of parameters. The use of small patches is also suitable
for tampering localization (the detection accuracy is then raised by
aggregating the patch scores).
II-B. CNN training strategy
We obtained the JPEG-aware CNN model by training the net-
work in two steps. First, the network is trained to recognize between
patches coming from pristine and contrast-adjusted images for the
uncompressed case, getting an (unaware) pre-trained model. Then,
the aware model is obtained by fine-tuning the unaware network,
by feeding the CNN with JPEG compressed examples of the above
classes. Since the network is pretty deep and then the number of
images used for training is very large, we performed compression
on-the-fly by augmenting the data inside the network; hence, the
compression is performed directly on the 64× 64 patches (that is,
after image splitting). Such a strategy is viable because the JPEG
compression is a local operator which can be applied separately on
multiples of 8 × 8 image patches producing the same result as if
it were applied on the entire image.
III. EXPERIMENTS
III-A. Methodology
We built the training and testing sets by starting from color
images in uncompressed format. The images for the H0 and H1
Fig. 3. Architecture of the proposed network.
classes were produced as detailed in Figure 1. The adjustment of the
contrast under H1 is obtained by considering several algorithms.
As we said, to generate the images used for training, we considered
the following operators: Adaptive Histogram Equalization (in par-
ticular, its refined, Contrast Limited, implementation, CLAHE [17]),
Gamma Correction (γ Corr), and Histogram Stretching (HS).
Such operators are designed for one-channel images; to make them
work on color images, we applied them as follows: for the images
processed with CLAHE, we first converted the images from RGB to
HSV, we applied the enhancement to the luminance channel only,
namely the V channel, and converted them back to the RGB domain
2. The same strategy is adopted to generate the images processed
with HS. Finally, for the γ Corr, the contrast is modified by
applying the operator to each channel (R, G and B) separately. The
above operators are applied in equal percentage to generate the
class of contrast adjusted images (H1). Regarding the parameters,
the clip-limit parameter for CLAHE is set to 0.005, the γ value to 1.5
and 0.7 (randomly chosen with probability 0.5), and the saturation
percentage of the HS to 5% for both black and white values. The
above choices do not introduce visually unpleasant artifacts.
For generating the test images, we also considered different
values of the parameters for the same operators (to assess the
performance under parameter mismatch), and different operators,
by processing the images with adjustment tools provided by Photo-
shop. In particular, we considered the following tonal adjustments:
• AutoContrast, AutoColor and AutoTone; algo-
rithms which operate differently with respect to the color
channels. The clipping is set to 7% for AutoContrast and
AutoColor and to 5% for AutoTone; the snap neutral
midtones option is selected for the AutoColor;
• Curves_S; a (hand-made) smooth S-curve is applied to
enhance the contrast in the midtones;
2The straightforward application of CLAHE (and HS) to each channel
separately unnaturally changes the color balance and produces visually
unpleasant images.
• Brightness and Contrast; generic tools for enhanc-
ing and reducing brightness and contrast; for the enhance-
ment, we set Brightness to 50 (Brightness+) and
Contrast to 70 (Contrast+), while for the reduction, we
set Brightness to -70 ( Brightness-) and Contrast
to -50 (Contrast-);
• Histogram Equalization (HistEq).
The HistEq manipulation is considered for completeness: al-
though its visual impact is much stronger with respect to that of
the other manipulations, and hence is rarely adopted in practice, the
HistEq manipulation is often considered in multimedia forensic
literature.
Regarding JPEG compression, we randomly selected the QF s
(uniformly) in the range [90, 100] to compress the images used for
training. For testing, we also considered images compressed with
QF 85 and 80.
III-B. Results
Uncompressed, camera-native, images (.tiff) are taken from the
RAISE8K dataset [18] (of size 4288× 2848), splitted into training
and test set, and then contrast-adjusted to produce the images
for H1 in the unaware case (i.e., without the final JPEG). The
images are then divided into 64×64 patches for CNN training and
testing: 2 × 106 patches per class (coming from more than 1000
training images) were selected to train the CNN, whereas 2× 105
patches were used for testing. In the aware case, the patches are
JPEG compressed with QF ∈ [90, 100]. The overall performance
of the detector are tested on 300 images from the test set, both
uncompressed and compressed with QF = {100, 98, 95, 90, 85, 80}.
The images used for training were all processed with the OpenCV
library for Python. For the tests, the Photoshop software was also
adopted. We used the TensorFlow framework, via the Keras API
[19], to implement our CNN. We ran our experiments using 2x
Asus GeForce GTX1080TI - 11GB DDR5 gpu. The Adam solver
is used with learning rate 1e− 4 and momentum 0.99. We set the
Table I. Performance (AUC) of the detector under matched pro-
cessing. The matched parameters are in bold.
QF
no jpg 100 98 95 90 85 80 75
CLAHE
0.003 100 99.9 99.8 98.9 97.6 97.1 96.8 96
0.005 100 99.9 99.9 99.4 98.9 98.8 98.5 98
0.007 100 99.9 100 99.6 99.1 98.9 98.7 98.5
γ Corr
1.5 98.8 98.5 94.2 89.2 87 84 81.2 81
1.7 99.4 98.9 95.7 91.8 90.4 89.7 89.2 88.1
0.7 99.1 97.1 92.3 87.3 85.6 81 78 69
0.6 99.7 99.5 97.3 91.6 86.7 83.7 80.1 77.3
HS (%)
3 99.6 98.1 95.8 91.4 87.8 85.7 83.5 83
5 99.5 98.9 97.6 93.7 92.6 91.5 90.3 89.4
7 100 99.3 98.3 95.5 94 93.7 93.6 93
batch size for training and testing to 32 images. Both the aware
and unaware models are trained on 3 epochs.
When training and testing are performed with uncompressed
images (unaware case), the average test accuracy of the CNN on
image patches is 93.5%, where the average is taken on the 3
manipulations, i.e., CLAHE, γ Corr (compression and expansion)
and HS, and on all the QFs inside the training range. For the overall
system, we get almost perfect classification, that is, the Area Under
Curve (AUC) is 99, 8%, which is in line with the state of the
art [10]. A noticeable strength is that here these performance are
achieved by one (generic) system only, rather than using separate
systems each one specialized on one manipulation. By testing the
unaware detector with JPEG compressed images, the performance
drop to AUC = 56% thus showing that the CNN model is not robust
to the JPEG laundering attack.
Concerning the aware case, the average accuracies that we
obtained at the patch level in the range of QFs [90, 100] are: 0.84
for CLAHE, 0.72 for γ Corr and 0.79 for HS. These accuracies are
not very high; however, the performance are moderately good with
respect to all the contrast adjustment operators. We also observe
that specializing our network to work with one QF only, we could
have obtained higher performance at the patch level; however,
as said before, to be robust against common manipulations (as
recompression and saving in uncompressed formats), we look for
a detector of generic contrast adjustments which works well on
a range of QF s. The overall performance of the detector on full
images are reported in Table I in terms of AUC, for both matched
and mismatched processing parameters. The CLAHE manipulation
is the easiest to detect (the AUC is always above 98%). The most
difficult case corresponds to γ Corr, where the AUC is below
90% for QF ≤ 95. This behavior is due to the fact that such kind
of adjustment is difficult to detect by itself and above all to the
fact that the CNN is simultaneously trained with values smaller and
larger than 1, corresponding to a compression and an expansion of
the contrast.3 These results significantly improve those achieved by
the SVM-based approaches from the literature, where, depending
on the specific contrast adjustment considered, the AUC may drop
to about 60% [11], and 72% [10] (on the average) in the presence
of JPEG compression in the same range.
We observe that the performance are good in the presence of
a mismatch in the processing parameters: better performance are
3We verified that if the detector is trained with γ = 1.5 only (gamma
expansion), the AUC for the γ Corr is above 97% for every QF ≥ 85. In
this case, however, the performance with respect to a compression (γ < 1)
are very poor even with large QF (e.g. AUC = 78% for QF = 95).
Table II. Performance (AUC) of the detector for different tonal
adjustments.
QF
no jpg 100 98 95 90 85 80
HistEq 100 99.9 99.9 99.5 98.3 96.9 94.8
Brightness+ 97.5 97.7 95.2 93.6 91.2 87.8 85.6
Contrast+ 99.1 100 99.6 97.9 94.7 91.9 87.1
Brightness- 96.7 97.3 93.3 90.1 84.2 78.8 75.6
Contrast- 98.8 99.6 96.4 91.2 87 82 80
Curve_S 99.6 99.8 99.8 99.1 97.7 96 93.6
AutoContrast 95.9 94.7 93 91.9 90.2 89 86.5
AutoColor 98.2 98.6 96.8 95.3 93.7 91.8 89.1
AutoTone 99.5 99.5 99 98.2 97.2 96.1 94.5
obtained when the adjustment is stronger than in the matched
case, and worse when it is weaker. The performance remain very
good in the absence of JPEG: the AUC is 99.6% on the average
in the matched case, which is in line with the AUC achieved
by the unaware detector. Expectedly, performance decrease as
QF decreases. However, good robustness to JPEG compression is
achieved (at least for CLAHE and HS) also when the QF is 85
and 80, which are outside the training range, whereas, below 80,
performance become poorer. It is worth observing that, for a fixed
false alarm rate, the threshold on the aggregated score changes by
varying the QF : specifically, for a false alarm of 5%, the threshold
ranges in [0.56 : 0.71]. Note that, since the last compression QF
is always known (or it can be estimated), such a variability of the
threshold is not a problem. Table II shows the results under various
contrast/brightness adjustment performed with Photoshop. Based on
these results, we can argue that the CNN-based detector scales well
with respect to the adjustment type maintaining good performance
when the tones of the image are adjusted in different ways and,
possibly, selectively in different tonal ranges (Curve_S), and when
the adjustment operates differently on the color channels (the Auto
processing). The AUC is large with respect to all the QF s for
some of the processing (AutoTone, Curve_S, HistEq) and, in
general, it remains above 90% in most of the cases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a JPEG-aware CNN-based approach to cope with
the well known problem of detection of contrast adjusted images in
the presence of JPEG post-processing. To accomplish this task, and
build a detector which works well for generic contrast adjustment,
we trained the CNN with a certain number of adjustments of
different nature. Results show that our detector achieves good per-
formance over a wide range of QFs and generalizes well to unseen
tonal adjustments. As further research, it would be interesting to
see if the performance with respect to the most difficult cases can
be improved by refining the composition of the training, i.e., the
types of contrast adjustments considered and their proportions, and
also the fusion strategy at the final stage. As a future work, we
would like to improve the performance at the patch level to move
from detection to localization.
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